1. Hans Kohn The Idea Of Nationalism

K-L Books: Kedourie, Elie. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background. Kohn writes that 'Nationalism is first and foremost a. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago Distribution Center. Nation, Nationhood, and Nationalism by Douglas Bradburn. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins. The modern character of this phenomenon and to posit the rupture of the idea of nationalism with earlier forms of cultural and political communities. A History of Nationalism in the East. Hans Kohn: The idea of Nationalism.

A nation state (or nation-state) is a state in which the great majority shares the same culture and is conscious of it. The nation state is an ideal in which cultural boundaries match up with political ones.^[1] According to one definition, 'a nation state is a sovereign state of which most of its subjects are united also by factors which defined a nation such as language or common descent.'^[2] It is a more precise concept than 'country', since a country does not need to have a predominant ethnic group.

A nation, in the sense of a common ethnicity, may include a diaspora or refugees who live outside the nation-state; some nations of this sense do not have a state where that ethnicity predominates. In a more general sense, a nation-state is simply a large, politically sovereign country or administrative territory. A nation-state may be contrasted with:

• A multinational state, where no one ethnic group dominates (may also be considered a multicultural state depending on the degree of cultural assimilation of various groups).
• A city-state which is both smaller than a 'nation' in the sense of 'large sovereign country' and which may or may not be dominated by all or part of a single 'nation' in the sense of a common ethnicity.^[3][4][5]
• An empire, which is composed of many countries (possibly non-sovereign states) and nations under a single monarch or ruling state government.
• A confederation, a league of sovereign states, which might or might not include nation-states.
• A federated state which may or may not be a nation-state, and which is only partially self-governing within a larger federation (for example, the state boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina are drawn along ethnic lines, but those of the United States are not).

This article mainly discusses the more specific definition of a nation-state, as a typically sovereign country dominated by a particular ethnicity.

• 6Exceptional cases
• 9Future
• 12References

Complexity[edit]

The relationship between a nation (in the ethnic sense) and a state can be complex. The presence of a state can encourage ethnogenesis, and a group with a pre-existing ethnic identity can influence the drawing of territorial boundaries or argue for political legitimacy.

This definition of a 'nation-state' is not universally accepted. 'All attempts to develop terminological consensus around 'nation' resulted in failure', concludes academic Valery Tishkov.^[6]

Walker Connor^[7] discusses the impressions surrounding the characters of 'nation', '(sovereign) state', 'nation state', and 'nationalism'. Connor, who gave the term 'ethnonationalism' wide currency, also discusses the tendency to confuse nation and state and the treatment of all states as if nation states. In Globalization and Belonging, Sheila L. Crouche discusses 'The Definitional Dilemma'.^[8]

History and origins[edit]

The origins and early history of nation states are disputed. A major theoretical question is: 'Which came first, the nation or the nation state?' Scholars such as Steven Weber, David Woodward, and Jeremy Black^[9][10][11] have advanced the hypothesis that the nation state did not arise out of political ingenuity or an unknown undetermined source, nor was it an accident of history or political invention; but is an inadvertent byproduct of 15th-century intellectual discoveries in political economy, capitalism, mercantilism, political geography, and geography^[12][13] combined together with cartography^[14][15] and advances in map-making technologies.^[16][17] It was with these intellectual discoveries and technological advances that the nation state arose. For others, the nation existed first, then nationalist movements arose for sovereignty, and the nation state was created to meet that demand. Some 'modernization theories' of nationalism see it as a product of government policies to unify and modernize an already existing state. Most theories see the nation state as a 19th-century European phenomenon, facilitated by developments such as state-mandated education, mass literacy and mass media. However, historians^[who?] also note the early emergence of a relatively unified state and identity in Portugal and the Dutch Republic.^{[citation needed]}

In France, Eric Hobsbawm argues, the French state preceded the formation of the French people. Hobsbawm considers that the state made the French nation, not French nationalism, which emerged at the end of the 19th century, the time of the Dreyfus Affair. At the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French, and 12–13% spoke the version of it that was to be found in literature and in educational facilities, according to Hobsbawm.^[18]

During the Italian unification, the number of people speaking the Italian language was even lower. The French state promoted the replacement of various regional dialects and languages by a centralised French language. The introduction of conscription and the Third Republic's 1880s laws on public instruction, facilitated the creation of a national identity, under this theory.^{[citation needed]}

Some nation states, such as Germany and Italy, came into existence at least partly as a result of political campaigns by nationalists, during the 19th century. In both cases, the territory was previously divided among other states, some of them very small. The sense of common identity was at first a cultural movement, such as in the Völkisch movement in German-speaking states, which rapidly acquired a political significance. In these cases, the nationalist sentiment and the nationalist movement clearly precede the unification of the German and Italian nation states.^{[citation needed]}

Historians Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Philip White and others have classified nations such as Germany or Italy, where cultural unification preceded state unification, as ethnic nations or ethnic nationalities. However, 'state-driven' national unifications, such as in France, England or China, are more likely to flourish in multiethnic societies, producing a traditional national heritage of civic nations, or territory-based nationalities.^[19][20][21] Some authors deconstruct the distinction between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism because of the ambiguity of the concepts. They argue that the paradigmatic case of Ernest Renan is an idealisation and it should be interpreted within the German tradition and not in opposition to it. For example, they argue that the arguments used by Renan at the conference What is a nation? are not consistent with his thinking. This alleged civic conception of the nation would be determined only by the case of the loss gives Alsace and Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War.^[22]

The idea of a nation state was and is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, often called the 'Westphalian system' in reference to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of power, which characterized that system, depended on its effectiveness upon clearly defined, centrally controlled, independent entities, whether empires or nation states, which recognize each other's sovereignty and territory. The Westphalian system did not create the nation state, but the nation state meets the criteria for its component states (by assuming that there is no disputed territory).^{[citation needed]}

The nation state received a philosophical underpinning in the era of Romanticism, at first as the 'natural' expression of the individual peoples (romantic nationalism: see Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conception of the Volk, later opposed by Ernest Renan). The increasing emphasis during the 19th century on the ethnic and racial origins of the nation, led to a redefinition of the nation state in these terms.^[21]Racism, which in Boulainvilliers's theories was inherently antipatriotic and antinationalist, joined itself with colonialistimperialism and 'continental imperialism', most notably in pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements.^[23]

The relation between racism and ethnic nationalism reached its height in the 20th century fascism and Nazism. The specific combination of 'nation' ('people') and 'state' expressed in such terms as the Völkische Staat and implemented in laws such as the 1935 Nuremberg laws made fascist states such as early Nazi Germany qualitatively different from non-fascist nation states. Minorities were not considered part of the people (Volk), and were consequently denied to have an authentic or legitimate role in such a state. In Germany, neither Jews nor the Roma were considered part of the people and were specifically targeted for persecution. German nationality law defined 'German' on the basis of German ancestry, excluding all non-Germans from the people.^{[citation needed]}

In recent years, a nation state's claim to absolute sovereignty within its borders has been much criticized.^[21] A global political system based on international agreements and supra-national blocs characterized the post-war era. Non-state actors, such as international corporations and non-governmental organizations, are widely seen as eroding the economic and political power of nation states, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance.^{[citation needed]}

Before the nation state[edit]

In Europe, during the 18th century, the classic non-national states were the multiethnicempires, the Austrian Empire, Kingdom of France, Kingdom of Hungary,^[24] the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire and smaller nations at what would now be called sub-state level. The multi-ethnic empire was an absolute monarchy ruled by a king, emperor or sultan. The population belonged to many ethnic groups, and they spoke many languages. The empire was dominated by one ethnic group, and their language was usually the language of public administration. The ruling dynasty was usually, but not always, from that group.

This type of state is not specifically European: such empires existed in Asia, Africa and the Americas. In the Muslim world, immediately after Muhammad's death in 632, Caliphates were established.^[25] Caliphates were Islamic states under the leadership of a political-religious successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad.^[26] These polities developed into multi-ethnic trans-national empires.^[27] The Ottoman sultan, Selim I (1512–1520) reclaimed the title of caliph, which had been in dispute and asserted by a diversity of rulers and 'shadow caliphs' in the centuries of the Abbasid-Mamluk Caliphate since the Mongols' sacking of Baghdad and the killing of the last Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, Iraq 1258.The Ottoman Caliphate as an office of the Ottoman Empire was abolished under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1924 as part of Atatürk's Reforms.

Some of the smaller European states were not so ethnically diverse, but were also dynastic states, ruled by a royal house. Their territory could expand by royal intermarriage or merge with another state when the dynasty merged. In some parts of Europe, notably Germany, very small territorial units existed. They were recognized by their neighbors as independent, and had their own government and laws. Some were ruled by princes or other hereditary rulers, some were governed by bishops or abbots. Because they were so small, however, they had no separate language or culture: the inhabitants shared the language of the surrounding region.

In some cases these states were simply overthrown by nationalist uprisings in the 19th century. Liberal ideas of free trade played a role in German unification, which was preceded by a customs union, the Zollverein. However, the Austro-Prussian War, and the German alliances in the Franco-Prussian War, were decisive in the unification. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire broke up after the First World War, and the Russian Empire became the Soviet Union after the Russian Civil War.

A few of the smaller states survived: the independent principalities of Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and the republic of San Marino. (Vatican City is a special case. All of the larger Papal States save the Vatican itself were occupied and absorbed by Italy by 1870. The resulting Roman Question was resolved with the rise of the modern state under the 1929 Lateran treaties between Italy and the Holy See.)

Characteristics[edit]

'Legitimate states that govern effectively and dynamic industrial economies are widely regarded today as the defining characteristics of a modern nation-state.'^[28]

Nation states have their own characteristics, differing from those of the pre-national states. For a start, they have a different attitude to their territory when compared with dynastic monarchies: it is semisacred and nontransferable. No nation would swap territory with other states simply, for example, because the king's daughter married. They have a different type of border, in principle defined only by the area of settlement of the national group, although many nation states also sought natural borders (rivers, mountain ranges). They are constantly changing in population size and power because of the limited restrictions of their borders.

The most noticeable characteristic is the degree to which nation states use the state as an instrument of national unity, in economic, social and cultural life.

The nation state promoted economic unity, by abolishing internal customs and tolls. In Germany, that process, the creation of the Zollverein, preceded formal national unity. Nation states typically have a policy to create and maintain a national transportation infrastructure, facilitating trade and travel. In 19th-century Europe, the expansion of the rail transport networks was at first largely a matter for private railway companies, but gradually came under control of the national governments. The French rail network, with its main lines radiating from Paris to all corners of France, is often seen as a reflection of the centralised French nation state, which directed its construction. Nation states continue to build, for instance, specifically national motorway networks. Specifically transnational infrastructure programmes, such as the Trans-European Networks, are a recent innovation.

The nation states typically had a more centralised and uniform public administration than its imperial predecessors: they were smaller, and the population less diverse. (The internal diversity of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was very great.) After the 19th-century triumph of the nation state in Europe, regional identity was subordinate to national identity, in regions such as Alsace-Lorraine, Catalonia, Brittany and Corsica. In many cases, the regional administration was also subordinated to central (national) government. This process was partially reversed from the 1970s onward, with the introduction of various forms of regional autonomy, in formerly centralised states such as France.

The most obvious impact of the nation state, as compared to its non-national predecessors, is the creation of a uniform national culture, through state policy. The model of the nation state implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by a common descent, a common language and many forms of shared culture. When the implied unity was absent, the nation state often tried to create it. It promoted a uniform national language, through language policy. The creation of national systems of compulsory primary education and a relatively uniform curriculum in secondary schools, was the most effective instrument in the spread of the national languages. The schools also taught the national history, often in a propagandistic and mythologised version, and (especially during conflicts) some nation states still teach this kind of history.^{[29][30][31][32][33]}

Language and cultural policy was sometimes negative, aimed at the suppression of non-national elements. Language prohibitions were sometimes used to accelerate the adoption of national languages and the decline of minority languages (see examples: Anglicisation, Czechization, Francisation, Italianization, Germanisation, Magyarisation, Polonisation, Russification, Serbization, Slovakisation).

In some cases, these policies triggered bitter conflicts and further ethnic separatism. But where it worked, the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of the population increased. Conversely, the cultural divergence at the border became sharper: in theory, a uniform French identity extends from the Atlantic coast to the Rhine, and on the other bank of the Rhine, a uniform German identity begins. To enforce that model, both sides have divergent language policy and educational systems.

In practice[edit]

In some cases, the geographic boundaries of an ethnic population and a political state largely coincide. In these cases, there is little immigration or emigration, few members of ethnic minorities, and few members of the 'home' ethnicity living in other countries.

Examples of nation states where ethnic groups make up more than 85% of the population include the following:

• Albania: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Albanian at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Armenia: The vast majority of Armenia's population consists of ethnic Armenians at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Bangladesh: The vast majority ethnic group of Bangladesh are the Bengali people, comprising 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of mostly Bihari migrants and indigenous tribal groups. Therefore, Bangladeshi society is to a great extent linguistically and culturally homogeneous, with very small populations of foreign expatriates and workers, although there is a substantial number of Bengali workers living abroad.
• China: The vast majority of China's population is Han, making up 92% of the population and geographically distributed on the eastern side of China. The government also recognizes 55 ethnic minorities, including Turks, Tibetans, Mongols and others.
• Egypt: The vast majority of Egypt's population consists of ethnic Egyptians at about 99% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Egyptian identity is closely tied to the geography of Egypt and its long history; its development over the centuries saw overlapping or conflicting ideologies. Though today an Arab people, that aspect constitutes for Egyptians a cultural dimension of their identity, not a necessary attribute of or prop for their national political being. Today most Egyptians see themselves, their history, culture and language (the Egyptian variant of Arabic) as specifically Egyptian and at the same time as part of the Arab world.
• Estonia: Defined as a nation state in its 1920 constitution,^{[citation needed]} up until the period of Soviet incorporation, Estonia was historically a very homogenous state with 88.2% of residents being Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Germans and 0.4% Jews according to the 1934 census.^[34][35] As a result of Soviet policies the demographic situation significantly changed with the arrival of Russian speaking settlers. Today Estonians form 69%, Russians 25.4%, Ukrainians 2.04% and Belarusians 1.1% of the population (2012).^[36] A significant proportion of the inhabitants (84.1%) are citizens of Estonia, around 7.3% are citizens of Russia and 7.0% as yet undefined citizenship (2010).^[34][36]
• Eswatini: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Swazi at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Greece: 91.6% of the permanent residents are ethnic Greek; the remaining 911929 inhabitants consist of immigrants from Albania (480,824), Bulgaria (75,915), Romania (46,253), former USSR (70,000), Western Europe (77,000) and the rest of the world (161,937).^[37]
• Hungary: The Hungarians (or Magyar) people consist of about 95% of the population, with a small Roma and German minority: see Demographics of Hungary.
• Iceland: Although the inhabitants are ethnically related to other Scandinavian groups, the national culture and language are found only in Iceland. There are no cross-border minorities as the nearest land is too far away: see Demographics of Iceland.
  Ainu, an ethnic minority people from Japan (between 1863 and early 1870s).
• Japan: Japan is also traditionally seen as an example of a nation state and also the largest of the nation states, with population in excess of 120 million. It should be noted that Japan has a small number of minorities such as Ryūkyū peoples, Koreans and Chinese, and on the northern island of Hokkaidō, the indigenous Ainu minority. However, they are either numerically insignificant (Ainu), their difference is not as pronounced (though Ryukyuan culture is closely related to Japanese culture, it is nonetheless distinctive in that it historically received much more influence from China and has separate political and nonpolitical and religious traditions) or well assimilated (Zainichi population is collapsing due to assimilation/naturalisation).
• Lebanon: The Lebanese Arabs comprise about 95% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Lebanese identity is closely tied to the geography of Lebanon and its history. Although they are now an Arab people and ethnically homogeneous, its identity oversees overlapping or conflicting ideologies between its Phoenician heritage and Arab heritage. While many Lebanese regard themselves as Arab, some Lebanese Christians, especially the Maronites, regard themselves, their history, and their culture as Phoenician and not Arab, while still other Lebanese regard themselves as both.
• Lesotho: Lesotho's ethno-linguistic structure consists almost entirely of the Basotho (singular Mosotho), a Bantu-speaking people; about 99.7% of the population are Basotho.
• Maldives: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Dhivehi at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of foreign workers; there are no indigenous ethnic minorities.
• Malta: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Maltese at about 95.3% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
• Mongolia: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Mongol at about 95.0% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few ethnic minorities included in Kazakhs.
• Poland: After World War II, with the genocide of the Jews by the invading German Nazis during the Holocaust, the expulsion of Germans after World War II and the loss of eastern territories (Kresy), 96.7% of the people of Poland claim Polish nationality, while 97.8% declare that they speak Polish at home (Census 2002.^{[citation needed]}).
• Several Polynesian countries such as Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, etc.^{[citation needed]}
• Portugal: Although surrounded by other lands and people, the Portuguese nation has occupied the same territory since the romanization or latinization of the native population during the Roman era. The modern Portuguese nation is a very old amalgam of formerly distinct historical populations that passed through and settled in the territory of modern Portugal: native Iberian peoples, Celts, ancient Mediterraneans (Greeks, Phoenicians, Romans, Jews), invading Germanic peoples like the Suebi and the Visigoths, and MuslimArabs and Berbers. Most Berber/Arab people and the Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the repopulation by Christians.
• San Marino: The Sammarinese make up about 97% of the population and all speak Italian and are ethnically and linguistically identical to Italians. San Marino is a landlocked enclave, completely surrounded by Italy. The state has a population of approximately 30,000, including 1,000 foreigners, most of whom are Italians.

The notion of a unifying 'national identity' also extends to countries that host multiple ethnic or language groups, such as India. For example, Switzerland is constitutionally a confederation of cantons, and has four official languages, but it has also a 'Swiss' national identity, a national history and a classic national hero, Wilhelm Tell.^[38]

Innumerable conflicts have arisen where political boundaries did not correspond with ethnic or cultural boundaries.

After World War II in the Josip Broz Tito era, nationalism was appealed to for uniting South Slav peoples. Later in the 20th century, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaders appealed to ancient ethnic feuds or tensions that ignited conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well as Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Macedonians, eventually breaking up the long collaboration of peoples. Ethnic cleansing was carried out in the Balkans, resulting in the destruction of the formerly socialist republic and producing the civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–95, resulting in mass population displacements and segregation that radically altered what was once a highly diverse and intermixed ethnic makeup of the region. These conflicts were largely about creating a new political framework of states, each of which would be ethnically and politically homogeneous. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks insisted they were ethnically distinct although many communities had a long history of intermarriage. Presently Slovenia (89% Slovene), Croatia (90.4% Croat)^[39] and Serbia (83% Serb) could be classified as nation states per se, whereas Macedonia (66% Macedonian), Montenegro (42% Montenegrin) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (50.1% Bosniak) are multinational states.

Belgium is a classic example of a state that is not a nation state. The state was formed by secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, whose neutrality and integrity was protected by the Treaty of London 1839; thus it served as a buffer state after the Napoleonic Wars between the European powers France, Prussia (after 1871 the German Empire) and the United Kingdom until World War I, when its neutrality was breached by the Germans. Currently, Belgium is divided between the Flemings in the north and the French-speaking or the German-speaking population in the south. The Flemish population in the north speaks Dutch, the Walloon population in the south speaks French or German. The Brussels population speaks French or Dutch.

The Flemish identity is also cultural, and there is a strong separatist movement espoused by the political parties, the right-wing Vlaams Belang and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. The Francophone Walloon identity of Belgium is linguistically distinct and regionalist. There is also unitary Belgian nationalism, several versions of a Greater Netherlands ideal, and a German-speaking community of Belgium annexed from Germany in 1920, and re-annexed by Germany in 1940–1944. However these ideologies are all very marginal and politically insignificant during elections.

China covers a large geographic area and uses the concept of 'Zhonghua minzu' or Chinese nationality, in the sense of ethnic groups, but it also officially recognizes the majority Han ethnic group which accounts for over 90% of the population, and no fewer than 55 ethnic national minorities.

According to Philip G. Roeder, Moldova is an example of a Soviet era 'segment-state' (Moldavian SSR), where the 'nation-state project of the segment-state trumped the nation-state project of prior statehood. In Moldova, despite strong agitation from university faculty and students for reunification with Romania, the nation-state project forged within the Moldavian SSR trumped the project for a return to the interwar nation-state project of Greater Romania.'^[41] See Controversy over linguistic and ethnic identity in Moldova for further details.

Exceptional cases[edit]

United Kingdom[edit]

The United Kingdom is an unusual example of a nation state, due to its claimed 'countries within a country' status. The United Kingdom, which is formed by the union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, is a unitary state formed initially by the merger of two independent kingdoms, the Kingdom of England (which already included Wales) and the Kingdom of Scotland, but the Treaty of Union (1707) that set out the agreed terms has ensured the continuation of distinct features of each state, including separate legal systems and separate national churches.^[42][43][44]

In 2003, the British Government described the United Kingdom as 'countries within a country'.^[45] While the Office for National Statistics and others describe the United Kingdom as a 'nation state',^[46][47] others, including a then Prime Minister, describe it as a 'multinational state',^[48][49][50] and the term Home Nations is used to describe the four national teams that represent the four nations of the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales).^[51] Some refer to it as a 'Union State'.^[52][53]

There has been academic debate over whether the United Kingdom can be legally dissolved as it is normally recognized internationally as a single nation state. English law jurist A.V. Dicey from an English legal perspective wrote that the question is based on whether the legislation giving rise to the union (the Union with Scotland Act), one of the two pieces of legislation which created the state, can be repealed. Dicey claimed because the Law of England does not acknowledge the word 'unconstitutional', as a matter of English law it can be repealed. He also stated any tampering with the Acts of Union 1707 would be political madness.^{[54][page needed][better source needed]}

Kingdom of the Netherlands[edit]

A similar unusual example is the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As of 10 October 2010, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four countries:^[55]

• Netherlands proper

Each is expressly designated as a land in Dutch law by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.^[56] Unlike the German Länder and the Austrian Bundesländer, landen is consistently translated as 'countries' by the Dutch government.^[57][58][59]

Israel[edit]

Israel was founded as a Jewish state in 1948. Its 'Basic Laws' describe it as both a Jewish and a democratic state. The Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018) explicitly specifies the nature of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 75.7% of Israel's population are Jews.^[60]Arabs, who make up 20.4% of the population, are the largest ethnic minority in Israel. Israel also has very small communities of Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Samaritans.^{[citation needed]} There are also some non-Jewish spouses of Israeli Jews. However, these communities are very small, and usually number only in the hundreds or thousands.^{[citation needed]}

Pakistan[edit]

Pakistan, even being an ethnically diverse country and officially a federation, is regarded as a nation state^[61] due to its ideological basis on which it was given independence from British India as a separate nation rather than as part of a unified India. Different ethnic groups in Pakistan are strongly bonded by their common Muslim identity, common cultural and social values, common historical heritage, a national lingua franca (Urdu) and joint political, strategic and economic interests.^[61][62]

Minorities[edit]

The most obvious deviation from the ideal of 'one nation, one state' is the presence of minorities, especially ethnic minorities, which are clearly not members of the majority nation. An ethnic nationalist definition of a nation is necessarily exclusive: ethnic nations typically do not have open membership. In most cases, there is a clear idea that surrounding nations are different, and that includes members of those nations who live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Historical examples of groups who have been specifically singled out as outsiders are the Roma and Jews in Europe.

Negative responses to minorities within the nation state have ranged from cultural assimilation enforced by the state, to expulsion, persecution, violence, and extermination. The assimilation policies are usually enforced by the state, but violence against minorities is not always state initiated: it can occur in the form of mob violence such as lynching or pogroms. Nation states are responsible for some of the worst historical examples of violence against minorities not considered part of the nation.

However, many nation states accept specific minorities as being part of the nation, and the term national minority is often used in this sense. The Sorbs in Germany are an example: for centuries they have lived in German-speaking states, surrounded by a much larger ethnic German population, and they have no other historical territory. They are now generally considered to be part of the German nation and are accepted as such by the Federal Republic of Germany, which constitutionally guarantees their cultural rights. Of the thousands of ethnic and cultural minorities in nation states across the world, only a few have this level of acceptance and protection.

Multiculturalism is an official policy in many states, establishing the ideal of peaceful existence among multiple ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Many nations have laws protecting minority rights.

When national boundaries that do not match ethnic boundaries are drawn, such as in the Balkans and Central Asia, ethnic tension, massacres and even genocide, sometimes has occurred historically (see Serbian genocide, Bosnian genocide and 2010 South Kyrgyzstan ethnic clashes).

Irredentism[edit]

Ideally, the border of a nation state extends far enough to include all the members of the nation, and all of the national homeland. Again, in practice some of them always live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Part of the national homeland may be there too, and it may be governed by the 'wrong' nation. The response to the non-inclusion of territory and population may take the form of irredentism: demands to annex unredeemed territory and incorporate it into the nation state.

Irredentist claims are usually based on the fact that an identifiable part of the national group lives across the border. However, they can include claims to territory where no members of that nation live at present, because they lived there in the past, the national language is spoken in that region, the national culture has influenced it, geographical unity with the existing territory, or a wide variety of other reasons. Past grievances are usually involved and can cause revanchism.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish irredentism from pan-nationalism, since both claim that all members of an ethnic and cultural nation belong in one specific state. Pan-nationalism is less likely to specify the nation ethnically. For instance, variants of Pan-Germanism have different ideas about what constituted Greater Germany, including the confusing term Grossdeutschland, which, in fact, implied the inclusion of huge Slavic minorities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Typically, irredentist demands are at first made by members of non-state nationalist movements. When they are adopted by a state, they typically result in tensions, and actual attempts at annexation are always considered a casus belli, a cause for war. In many cases, such claims result in long-term hostile relations between neighbouring states. Irredentist movements typically circulate maps of the claimed national territory, the greater nation state. That territory, which is often much larger than the existing state, plays a central role in their propaganda.

Irredentism should not be confused with claims to overseas colonies, which are not generally considered part of the national homeland. Some French overseas colonies would be an exception: French rule in Algeria unsuccessfully treated the colony as a département of France.

Future[edit]

It has been speculated by both proponents of globalization and various science fiction writers that the concept of a nation state may disappear with the ever-increasing interconnectedness of the world.^[21][63][64] Such ideas are sometimes expressed around concepts of a world government. Another possibility is a societal collapse and move into communal anarchy or zero world government, in which nation states no longer exist.

Globalization especially has helped to bring about the discussion about the disappearance of nation states, as global trade and the rise of the concepts of a 'global citizen' and a common identity have helped to reduce differences and 'distances' between individual nation states, especially with regards to the internet.^[65]

Clash of civilizations[edit]

The theory of the clash of civilizations lies in direct contrast to cosmopolitan theories about an ever more-connected world that no longer requires nation states. According to political scientistSamuel P. Huntington, people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post–Cold War world.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture^[66] at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled 'The Clash of Civilizations?',^[67] in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post–Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economics had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post–Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, argued that the world had reached a Hegelian 'end of history'.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had reverted only to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.

In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.^[67]

Sandra Joireman suggests that Huntington may be characterised as a neo-primordialist, as, while he sees people as having strong ties to their ethnicity, he does not believe that these ties have always existed.^[68]

Historiography[edit]

Historians often look to the past to find the origins of a particular nation state. Indeed, they often put so much emphasis on the importance of the nation state in modern times, that they distort the history of earlier periods in order to emphasize the question of origins. Lansing and English argue that much of the medieval history of Europe was structured to follow the historical winners—especially the nation states that emerged around Paris and London. Important developments that did not directly lead to a nation state get neglected, they argue:

one effect of this approach has been to privilege historical winners, aspects of medieval Europe that became important in later centuries, above all the nation state.. Arguably the liveliest cultural innovation in the 13th century was Mediterranean, centered on Frederick II's polyglot court and administration in Palermo..Sicily and the Italian South in later centuries suffered a long slide into overtaxed poverty and marginality. Textbook narratives therefore focus not on medieval Palermo, with its Muslim and Jewish bureaucracies and Arabic-speaking monarch, but on the historical winners, Paris and London.^[69]

See also[edit]

• Bioregionalism as an alternative to nation states.

References[edit]

• Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. ISBN0-86091-329-5.
• Colomer, Josep M. 2007. Great Empires, Small Nations. The Uncertain Future of the Sovereign State. ISBN0-415-43775-X.
• Gellner, Ernest (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN0-8014-1662-0.
• Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN0-521-43961-2.
• James, Paul (1996). Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community. London: Sage Publications. ISBN0-7619-5072-9.
• Khan, Ali (1992). The Extinction of Nation states
• Renan, Ernest. 1882. 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' ('What is a Nation?')
• Malesevic, Sinisa (2006). Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism New York: Palgrave.
• Smith, Anthony D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nations London: Basil Blackwell. pp 6–18. ISBN0-631-15205-9.
• White, Philip L. (2006). 'Globalization and the Mythology of the Nation State,' In A.G.Hopkins, ed. Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 257–284. [1]

Notes[edit]

1. ^'Nation-State'. UNESCO.
2. ^Paleri, Prabhakaran. Integrated Maritime Security: Governing The Ghost Protocol.
3. ^Peter Radan (2002). The break-up of Yugoslavia and international law. Psychology Press. p. 14. ISBN978-0-415-25352-9. Retrieved 25 November 2010.
4. ^Alfred Michael Boll (2007). Multiple nationality and international law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 67. ISBN978-90-04-14838-3. Retrieved 25 November 2010.
5. ^Daniel Judah Elazar (1998). Covenant and civil society: the constitutional matrix of modern democracy. Transaction Publishers. p. 129. ISBN978-1-56000-311-3. Retrieved 25 November 2010.
6. ^Tishkov, Valery (2000). 'Forget the 'nation': post-nationalist understanding of nationalism'. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 23 (4): 625–650 [p. 627]. doi:10.1080/01419870050033658.
7. ^Connor, Walker (1978). 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..'. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 1 (4): 377–400. doi:10.1080/01419870.1978.9993240.
8. ^pp. 85ff
9. ^Jeremy Black Maps and Politics pp.59–98 1998
10. ^Maps and Politics pp.100–147 1998
11. ^Robert, L Carneiro (21 August 1970). 'A Theory Of The Origin Of The State'. Science. 169: 733–738.
12. ^International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences. Direct Georeferencing : A New Standard in Photogrammetry for High Accuracy Mapping Volume XXXIX pp.5–9 2012
13. ^International Archives of the Photogrammetry On Borders:From Ancient to Postmodern Times Volume 40 pp.1–7 2013
14. ^International Archives of the Photogrammetry Borderlines: Maps and the spread of the Westphalian state from Europe to Asia Part One –The European Context Volume 40 pp.111–116 2013
15. ^International Archives of the Photogrammetry Appearance and Appliance of the Twin-Cities Concept on the Russian-Chinese Border Volume 40 pp.105–110 2013
16. ^'How Maps Made the World'. Wilson Quarterly. Summer 2011. Archived from the original on 11 August 2011. Retrieved 28 July 2011. Source: 'Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change' by Jordan Branch, in International Organization, Volume 65, Issue 1, Winter 2011
17. ^Branch, Jordan Nathaniel; advisor, Steven Weber (2011). 'Mapping the Sovereign State: Cartographic Technology, Political Authority, and Systemic Change'(Ph.D.). Publication Number 3469226. University of California, Berkeley. pp. 1–36. doi:10.1017/S0020818310000299. Retrieved 5 March 2012. Abstract: How did modern territorial states come to replace earlier forms of organization, defined by a wide variety of territorial and non-territorial forms of authority? Answering this question can help to explain both where our international political system came from and where it might be going ..
18. ^Hobsbawm, Eric (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780 (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 60. ISBN0521439612.
19. ^Kohn, Hans (1955). Nationalism: Its Meaning & History
20. ^Greenfeld, Liah (1992). Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
21. ^ ^abcdWhite, Philip L. (2006). 'Globalization and the Mythology of the Nation State', In A.G.Hopkins, ed. Global History: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 257–284
22. ^Azurmendi, Joxe: Historia, arraza, nazioa, Donostia: Elkar, 2014. ISBN978-84-9027-297-8
23. ^See Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951)
24. ^^ Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990; ISBN0-521-43961-2) chapter II 'The popular protonationalism', pp.80–81 French edition (Gallimard, 1992). According to Hobsbawm, the main source for this subject is Ferdinand Brunot (ed.), Histoire de la langue française, Paris, 1927–1943, 13 volumes, in particular volume IX. He also refers to Michel de Certeau, Dominique Julia, Judith Revel, Une politique de la langue: la Révolution française et les patois: l'enquête de l'abbé Grégoire, Paris, 1975. For the problem of the transformation of a minority official language into a widespread national language during and after the French Revolution, see Renée Balibar, L'Institution du français: essai sur le co-linguisme des Carolingiens à la République, Paris, 1985 (also Le co-linguisme, PUF, Que sais-je?, 1994, but out of print) ('The Institution of the French language: essay on colinguism from the Carolingian to the Republic. Finally, Hobsbawm refers to Renée Balibar and Dominique Laporte, Le Français national: politique et pratique de la langue nationale sous la Révolution, Paris, 1974.
25. ^Nigosian, Solomon A. (29 January 2004). Islam: Its History, Teaching, and Practices. Indiana University Press. p. 18. ISBN978-0-253-11074-9.
26. ^Kadi, Wadad; Shahin, Aram A. (2013). 'Caliph, caliphate'. The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought: 81–86.
27. ^Al-Rasheed, Madawi; Kersten, Carool; Shterin, Marat (11 December 2012). Demystifying the Caliphate: Historical Memory and Contemporary Contexts. Oxford University Press. p. 3. ISBN978-0-19-932795-9.
28. ^Kohli, Atul (2004). State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 1. ISBN978-0-521-54525-9.
29. ^Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2001)15 on history teaching in 21st-century Europe (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 October 2001 at the 771st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
30. ^'History Interpretation as a Cause of Conflicts in Europe'. united.non-profit.nl. UNITED for Intercultural Action. Archived from the original on 4 October 2006.
31. ^Hobsbawm, Eric; Ranger, Terence (1992). The Invention of Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN0-521-43773-3.
32. ^Melman, Billie (1991). 'Claiming the Nation's Past: The Invention of an Anglo-Saxon Tradition'. Journal of Contemporary History. 26 (3/4): 575–595. doi:10.1177/002200949102600312. JSTOR260661.
33. ^Hughes, Christopher (1999). 'Robert Stone Nation-Building and Curriculum Reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan'. China Quarterly. 160: 977–991. doi:10.1017/s0305741000001405.
34. ^ ^abKalekin-Fishman, D.; Pirkko Pitkänen (2006). Multiple Citizenship as a Challenge to European Nation-States. Sense Publishers. p. 215. ISBN978-90-77874-86-8.
35. ^Zetterberg, Seppo (2001). Eesti Ajalugu (in Estonian). p. 601. OCLC948319961.
36. ^ ^ab'Rahvaarv rahvuse järgi, 1. jaanuar, aastad'. stat.ee. 2001–2010.
37. ^An X-ray of the population of Greece Today, Έθνος, 16 September 2013, http://www.ethnos.gr/arthro/mia_aktinografia_tou_plithysmou_tis_simerinis_elladas-63888376/
38. ^Thomas Riklin, 2005. Worin unterscheidet sich die schweizerische 'Nation' von der Französischen bzw. Deutschen 'Nation'? 'Archived copy'(PDF). Archived from the original(PDF) on 13 October 2006. Retrieved 13 October 2006.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link)
39. ^'Central Bureau of Statistics'. www.dzs.hr. Retrieved 5 April 2016.
40. ^Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1983. The map shows the distribution of ethnolinguistic groups according to the historical majority ethnic groups by region. Note this is different from the current distribution due to age-long internal migration and assimilation.
41. ^Philip G. Roeder (2007). Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism. Princeton University Press. p. 126. ISBN978-0-691-13467-3.
42. ^Doherty, Michael (2016). Public Law. Rutledge. pp. 198–201. ISBN1317206657.
43. ^McCann, Philip (2016). The UK Regional–National Economic Problem: Geography, globalisation and governance. Routledge. p. 372. ISBN9781317237174.
44. ^The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. 'UK Toponnymic Guidelines'(PDF). UK Government.
45. ^'Countries within a country, number10.gov.uk'. Webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk. 10 January 2003. Archived from the original on 9 September 2008. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
46. ^'ONS Glossary of economic terms'. Office for National Statistics. Archived from the original on 7 September 2011. Retrieved 24 July 2010.
47. ^Giddens, Anthony (2006). Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 41. ISBN978-0-7456-3379-4.
48. ^Hogwood, Brian. 'Regulatory Reform in a Multinational State: The Emergence of Multilevel Regulation in the United Kingdom'. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
49. ^'Gordon Brown: We must defend the Union'. telegraph.co.uk. 25 March 2008.
50. ^'DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP CURRICULUM REVIEW'(PDF). Department for Education and Skills. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
51. ^Magnay, Jacquelin (26 May 2010). 'London 2012: Hugh Robertson puts Home Nations football team on agenda'. Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 11 September 2010.
52. ^INDEPENDENT WORKERS UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN (IWGB) (2016). 'WRITTEN INTERVENTION FOR THE INDEPENDENT WORKERS UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN (IWGB)'(PDF).
53. ^'The United Kingdom as a Union State'. 2006. doi:10.1093/0199258201.003.0001.
54. ^Dicey, A.V. (1915). Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed.).
55. ^'Netherlands Antilles no more — Stabroek News — Guyana'. Stabroek News. 9 October 2010. Retrieved 18 December 2011.
56. ^'Article 1 of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands'. Lexius.nl. Archived from the original on 24 July 2011. Retrieved 18 December 2011.
57. ^'Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations -Aruba'. English.minbzk.nl. 24 January 2003. Retrieved 18 December 2011.
58. ^'St Martin News Network'. smn-news.com. 18 November 2010.
59. ^'Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations — New Status'. English.minbzk.nl. 1 October 2009. Retrieved 18 December 2011.
60. ^'Israel at 62: Population of 7,587,000'. Ynet.co.il. 20 June 1995. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
61. ^ ^abStanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan
62. ^Mahomed Ali Jinnah (1992) [originally published 1940], Problem of India's future constitution, and allied articles, Minerva Book Shop, Anarkali, Lahore, ISBN978-969-0-10122-8, .. understood in the West, by a Hindu or a Muslim, but a complete social order which affects all the activities in life. In Islam, religion is the motive spring of all actions in life. A Muslim of one country has far more sympathies with a Muslim living in another country than with a non-Muslim living in the same country ..
63. ^'03323_Hicks.qxd'(PDF). Retrieved 26 September 2008.
64. ^'Politics in Modern Science Fiction Syllabus'. Ocf.berkeley.edu. Retrieved 26 September 2008.
65. ^Scott, Derek; Simpson, Anna-Louise (2008). Power and International Politics. Social Education Victoria.
66. ^'U.S. Trade Policy — Economics'. AEI. 15 February 2007. Archived from the original on 29 June 2013. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
67. ^ ^abOfficial copy (free preview): 'The Clash of Civilizations?'. Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993. Archived from the original on 29 June 2007.
68. ^Sandra Fullerton Joireman (2003). Nationalism and Political Identity. London: Continuum. p. 30. ISBN0-8264-6591-9.
69. ^Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds. (2012). A Companion to the Medieval World. John Wiley & Sons. p. 4.CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)

External links[edit]

• From Paris to Cairo: Resistance of the Unacculturated on identity and the nation state.

Milton Friedman (/ˈfriːdmən/; July 31, 1912 – November 16, 2006) was an American economist who received the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and the complexity of stabilization policy.^[4] With George Stigler and others, Friedman was among the intellectual leaders of the second generation of Chicago price theory, a methodological movement at the University of Chicago's Department of Economics, Law School and Graduate School of Business from the 1940s onward. Several students and young professors who were recruited or mentored by Friedman at Chicago went on to become leading economists, including Gary Becker, Robert Fogel, Thomas Sowell^[5] and Robert Lucas Jr.^[6]

Friedman's challenges to what he later called 'naive Keynesian' theory^[7] began with his 1950s reinterpretation of the consumption function. In the 1960s, he became the main advocate opposing Keynesian government policies^[8] and described his approach (along with mainstream economics) as using 'Keynesian language and apparatus' yet rejecting its 'initial' conclusions.^[9] He theorized that there existed a 'natural' rate of unemployment and argued that unemployment below this rate would cause inflation to accelerate.^[10] He argued that the Phillips curve was in the long run vertical at the 'natural rate' and predicted what would come to be known as stagflation.^[11] Friedman promoted an alternative macroeconomic viewpoint known as 'monetarism' and argued that a steady, small expansion of the money supply was the preferred policy.^[12] His ideas concerning monetary policy, taxation, privatization and deregulation influenced government policies, especially during the 1980s. His monetary theory influenced the Federal Reserve's response to the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.^[13]

Friedman was an advisor to Republican President Ronald Reagan^[3] and Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.^[2] His political philosophy extolled the virtues of a free market economic system with minimal intervention. He once stated that his role in eliminating conscription in the United States was his proudest accomplishment. In his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman advocated policies such as a volunteer military, freely floating exchange rates, abolition of medical licenses, a negative income tax and school vouchers^[14] and opposed the war on drugs. His support for school choice led him to found the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, later renamed EdChoice.^[15]

Friedman's works include monographs, books, scholarly articles, papers, magazine columns, television programs and lectures and cover a broad range of economic topics and public policy issues.^[16] His books and essays have had global influence, including in former communist states.^{[17][18][19][20]} A survey of economists ranked Friedman as the second-most popular economist of the 20th century following only John Maynard Keynes^[21] and The Economist described him as 'the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th century .. possibly of all of it'.^[22]

• 3Academic career
  • 3.2University of Chicago
• 4Personal life
• 5Scholarly contributions
• 6Public policy positions
• 7Honors, recognition, and influence
• 8Criticism
• 11References

Early life[edit]

Friedman was born in Brooklyn, New York on July 31, 1912. His parents, Sára Ethel (née Landau) and Jenő Saul Friedman,^[23] were Jewish immigrants from Beregszász in Carpathian Ruthenia, Kingdom of Hungary (now Berehove in Ukraine). They both worked as dry goods merchants. Shortly after his birth, the family relocated to Rahway, New Jersey. In his early teens, Friedman was injured in a car accident, which scarred his upper lip.^[24][25] A talented student, Friedman graduated from Rahway High School in 1928, just before his 16th birthday.^[26][27] He was awarded a competitive scholarship to Rutgers University (then a private university receiving limited support from the State of New Jersey, e.g., for such scholarships).

In 1932, Friedman graduated from Rutgers University, where he specialized in mathematics and economics and initially intended to become an actuary. During his time at Rutgers, Friedman became influenced by two economics professors, Arthur F. Burns and Homer Jones, who convinced him that modern economics could help end the Great Depression.

After graduating from Rutgers, Friedman was offered two scholarships to do graduate work—one in mathematics at Brown University and the other in economics at the University of Chicago.^[28] Friedman chose the latter, thus earning a Master of Arts degree in 1933. He was strongly influenced by Jacob Viner, Frank Knight, and Henry Simons. It was at Chicago that Friedman met his future wife, economist Rose Director. During the 1933–1934 academic year he had a fellowship at Columbia University, where he studied statistics with renowned statistician and economist Harold Hotelling. He was back in Chicago for the 1934–1935 academic year, working as a research assistant for Henry Schultz, who was then working on Theory and Measurement of Demand. That year, Friedman formed what would prove to be lifelong friendships with George Stigler and W. Allen Wallis.^[29]

Public service[edit]

Friedman was initially unable to find academic employment, so in 1935 he followed his friend W. Allen Wallis to Washington, D.C., where Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal was 'a lifesaver' for many young economists.^[30] At this stage, Friedman said that he and his wife 'regarded the job-creation programs such as the WPA, CCC, and PWA appropriate responses to the critical situation,' but not 'the price- and wage-fixing measures of the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.'^[31] Foreshadowing his later ideas, he believed price controls interfered with an essential signaling mechanism to help resources be used where they were most valued. Indeed, Friedman later concluded that all government intervention associated with the New Deal was 'the wrong cure for the wrong disease,' arguing that the money supply should simply have been expanded, instead of contracted.^[32] Later, Friedman and his colleague Anna Schwartz wrote A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which argued that the Great Depression was caused by a severe monetary contraction due to banking crises and poor policy on the part of the Federal Reserve.^[33]

During 1935, he began working for the National Resources Planning Board,^[34] which was then working on a large consumer budget survey. Ideas from this project later became a part of his Theory of the Consumption Function. Friedman began employment with the National Bureau of Economic Research during autumn 1937 to assist Simon Kuznets in his work on professional income. This work resulted in their jointly authored publication Incomes from Independent Professional Practice, which introduced the concepts of permanent and transitory income, a major component of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that Friedman worked out in greater detail in the 1950s. The book hypothesizes that professional licensing artificially restricts the supply of services and raises prices.

During 1940, Friedman was appointed an assistant professor teaching Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but encountered antisemitism in the Economics department and decided to return to government service.^[35][36] From 1941 to 1943 Friedman worked on wartime tax policy for the federal government, as an advisor to senior officials of the United States Department of the Treasury. As a Treasury spokesman during 1942 he advocated a Keynesian policy of taxation. He helped to invent the payroll withholding tax system, since the federal government badly needed money in order to fight the war.^[37] He later said, 'I have no apologies for it, but I really wish we hadn't found it necessary and I wish there were some way of abolishing withholding now.'^[38]

Academic career[edit]

Early years[edit]

In 1940, Friedman accepted a position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but left because of differences with faculty regarding United States involvement in World War II. Friedman believed the United States should enter the war.^[39] In 1943, Friedman joined the Division of War Research at Columbia University (headed by W. Allen Wallis and Harold Hotelling), where he spent the rest of World War II working as a mathematical statistician, focusing on problems of weapons design, military tactics, and metallurgical experiments.^[39][40]

In 1945, Friedman submitted Incomes from Independent Professional Practice (co-authored with Kuznets and completed during 1940) to Columbia as his doctoral dissertation. The university awarded him a PhD in 1946.^[41][42] Friedman spent the 1945–1946 academic year teaching at the University of Minnesota (where his friend George Stigler was employed). On February 12, 1945, his son, David D. Friedman was born.

University of Chicago[edit]

In 1946, Friedman accepted an offer to teach economic theory at the University of Chicago (a position opened by departure of his former professor Jacob Viner to Princeton University). Friedman would work for the University of Chicago for the next 30 years. There he contributed to the establishment of an intellectual community that produced a number of Nobel Prize winners, known collectively as the Chicago school of economics.

At that time, Arthur F. Burns, who was then the head of the National Bureau of Economic Research, asked Friedman to rejoin the Bureau's staff. He accepted the invitation, and assumed responsibility for the Bureau's inquiry into the role of money in the business cycle. As a result, he initiated the 'Workshop in Money and Banking' (the 'Chicago Workshop'), which promoted a revival of monetary studies. During the latter half of the 1940s, Friedman began a collaboration with Anna Schwartz, an economic historian at the Bureau, that would ultimately result in the 1963 publication of a book co-authored by Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

Friedman spent the 1954–1955 academic year as a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. At the time, the Cambridge economics faculty was divided into a Keynesian majority (including Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn) and an anti-Keynesian minority (headed by Dennis Robertson). Friedman speculated that he was invited to the fellowship, because his views were unacceptable to both of the Cambridge factions. Later his weekly columns for Newsweek magazine (1966–84) were well read and increasingly influential among political and business people,^[43] and helped earn the magazine a Gerald Loeb Special Award in 1968.^[44] From 1968 to 1978, he and Paul Samuelson participated in the Economics Cassette Series, a biweekly subscription series where the economist would discuss the days' issues for about a half-hour at a time.^[45][46]

Friedman was an economic adviser to Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater during 1964.

Capitalism and Freedom[edit]

His Capitalism and Freedom brought him national and international attention outside academia. It was published in 1962 by the University of Chicago Press and consists of essays that used non-mathematical economic models to explore issues of public policy.^[47] It sold over 400,000 copies in the first eighteen years^[48] and more than half a million since 1962. It has been translated into eighteen languages. Friedman talks about the need to move to a classically liberal society, that free markets would help nations and individuals in the long-run and fix the efficiency problems currently faced by the United States and other major countries of the 1950s and 1960s. He goes through the chapters specifying a specific issue in each respective chapter from the role of government and money supply to social welfare programs to a special chapter on occupational licensure. Friedman concludes Capitalism and Freedom with his 'classical liberal' (more accurately, libertarian) stance, that government should stay out of matters that do not need and should only involve itself when absolutely necessary for the survival of its people and the country. He recounts how the best of a country's abilities come from its free markets while its failures come from government intervention.^[49]

Personal life[edit]

Retirement[edit]

In 1977, at the age of 65, Friedman retired from the University of Chicago after teaching there for 30 years. He and his wife moved to San Francisco, where he became a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. From 1977 on, he was affiliated with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. During the same year, Friedman was approached by the Free To Choose Network and asked to create a television program presenting his economic and social philosophy.

The Friedmans worked on this project for the next three years, and during 1980, the ten-part series, titled Free to Choose, was broadcast by the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). The companion book to the series (co-authored by Milton and his wife, Rose Friedman), also titled Free To Choose, was the bestselling nonfiction book of 1980 and has since been translated into 14 languages.

Friedman served as an unofficial adviser to Ronald Reagan during his 1980 presidential campaign, and then served on the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board for the rest of the Reagan Administration. Ebenstein says Friedman was 'the 'guru' of the Reagan administration.'^[3] In 1988 he received the National Medal of Science and Reagan honored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Milton Friedman is known now as one of the most influential economists of the 20th century.^[50][51] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Friedman continued to write editorials and appear on television. He made several visits to Eastern Europe and to China, where he also advised governments. He was also for many years a Trustee of the Philadelphia Society.^[52][53][54]

Later life[edit]

According to a 2007 article in Commentary magazine, his 'parents were moderately observant Jews, but Friedman, after an intense burst of childhood piety, rejected religion altogether.'^[55] He described himself as an agnostic.^[56] Friedman wrote extensively of his life and experiences, especially in 1998 in his memoirs with his wife, Rose, titled Two Lucky People.

Death[edit]

Friedman died of heart failure at the age of 94 years in San Francisco on November 16, 2006.^[57] He was still a working economist performing original economic research; his last column was published in The Wall Street Journal the day after his death.^[58] He was survived by his wife (who died on August 18, 2009) and their two children, David, known for the anarcho-capitalist book The Machinery of Freedom, and bridge expert Jan Martel.

Scholarly contributions[edit]

Economics[edit]

Friedman was best known for reviving interest in the money supply as a determinant of the nominal value of output, that is, the quantity theory of money. Monetarism is the set of views associated with modern quantity theory. Its origins can be traced back to the 16th-century School of Salamanca or even further; however, Friedman's contribution is largely responsible for its modern popularization. He co-authored, with Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), which was an examination of the role of the money supply and economic activity in the U.S. history. A striking conclusion of their research regarded the way in which money supply fluctuations contribute to economic fluctuations. Several regression studies with David Meiselman during the 1960s suggested the primacy of the money supply over investment and government spending in determining consumption and output. These challenged a prevailing, but largely untested, view on their relative importance. Friedman's empirical research and some theory supported the conclusion that the short-run effect of a change of the money supply was primarily on output but that the longer-run effect was primarily on the price level.

Friedman was the main proponent of the monetarist school of economics. He maintained that there is a close and stable association between inflation and the money supply, mainly that inflation could be avoided with proper regulation of the monetary base's growth rate. He famously used the analogy of 'dropping money out of a helicopter',^[59] in order to avoid dealing with money injection mechanisms and other factors that would overcomplicate his models.

Friedman's arguments were designed to counter the popular concept of cost-push inflation, that the increased general price level at the time was the result of increases in the price of oil, or increases in wages; as he wrote,

Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.

Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand management; and he held that the government's role in the guidance of the economy should be restricted severely. Friedman wrote extensively on the Great Depression, and he termed the 1929–1933 period the Great Contraction. He argued that the Depression had been caused by an ordinary financial shock whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of the money supply caused by the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve.

The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 .. Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.

This theory was put forth in A Monetary History of the United States, and the chapter on the Great Depression was then published as a stand-alone book entitled The Great Contraction, 1929–1933. Both books are still in print from Princeton University Press, and some editions include as an appendix a speech at a University of Chicago event honoring Friedman^[62] in which Ben Bernanke made this statement:

Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression, you're right. We did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.^[63][62]

Friedman also argued for the cessation of government intervention in currency markets, thereby spawning an enormous literature on the subject, as well as promoting the practice of freely floating exchange rates. His close friend George Stigler explained, 'As is customary in science, he did not win a full victory, in part because research was directed along different lines by the theory of rational expectations, a newer approach developed by Robert Lucas, also at the University of Chicago.'^[64] The relationship between Friedman and Lucas, or new classical macroeconomics as a whole, was highly complex. The Friedmanian Phillips curve was an interesting starting point for Lucas, but he soon realized that the solution provided by Friedman was not quite satisfactory. Lucas elaborated a new approach in which rational expectations were presumed instead of the Friedmanian adaptive expectations. Due to this reformulation, the story in which the theory of the new classical Phillips curve was embedded radically changed. This modification, however, had a significant effect on Friedman's own approach, so, as a result, the theory of the Friedmanian Phillips curve also changed.^[65] Moreover, new classical Neil Wallace, who was a graduate student at the University of Chicago between 1960 and 1963, regarded Friedman's theoretical courses as a mess.^[66] This evaluation clearly indicates the broken relationship between Friedmanian monetarism and new classical macroeconomics.

Friedman was also known for his work on the consumption function, the permanent income hypothesis (1957), which Friedman himself referred to as his best scientific work.^[67] This work contended that rational consumers would spend a proportional amount of what they perceived to be their permanent income. Windfall gains would mostly be saved. Tax reductions likewise, as rational consumers would predict that taxes would have to increase later to balance public finances. Other important contributions include his critique of the Phillips curve and the concept of the natural rate of unemployment (1968). This critique associated his name, together with that of Edmund Phelps, with the insight that a government that brings about greater inflation cannot permanently reduce unemployment by doing so. Unemployment may be temporarily lower, if the inflation is a surprise, but in the long run unemployment will be determined by the frictions and imperfections of the labor market.

Friedman's essay 'The Methodology of Positive Economics' (1953) provided the epistemological pattern for his own subsequent research and to a degree that of the Chicago School. There he argued that economics as science should be free of value judgments for it to be objective. Moreover, a useful economic theory should be judged not by its descriptive realism but by its simplicity and fruitfulness as an engine of prediction. That is, students should measure the accuracy of its predictions, rather than the 'soundness of its assumptions'. His argument was part of an ongoing debate among such statisticians as Jerzy Neyman, Leonard Savage, and Ronald Fisher.^[68]

Statistics[edit]

One of his most famous contributions to statistics is sequential sampling. Friedman did statistical work at the Division of War Research at Columbia, where he and his colleagues came up with the technique. It became, in the words of The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 'the standard analysis of quality control inspection'. The dictionary adds, 'Like many of Friedman's contributions, in retrospect it seems remarkably simple and obvious to apply basic economic ideas to quality control; that, however, is a measure of his genius.'^[69]

Public policy positions[edit]

Federal Reserve and monetary policy[edit]

Although Friedman concluded the government does have a role in the monetary system^[70] he was critical of the Federal Reserve due to its poor performance and felt it should be abolished.^[71][72][73] He was opposed to Federal Reserve policies, even during the so-called 'Volcker shock' that was labelled 'monetarist'.^[74] Friedman believed that the Federal Reserve System should ultimately be replaced with a computer program.^[75] He favored a system that would automatically buy and sell securities in response to changes in the money supply.^[76]

The proposal to constantly grow the money supply at a certain predetermined amount every year has become known as Friedman's k-percent rule.^[77] There is debate about the effectiveness of a theoretical money supply targeting regime.^[78][79] The Fed's inability to meet its money supply targets from 1978–1982 has led some to conclude it is not a feasible alternative to more conventional inflation and interest rate targeting.^[80] Towards the end of his life Milton Friedman expressed doubt about the validity of targeting the quantity of money.^[81]

Ideally, Friedman actually favored the principles of the 1930s Chicago plan, which would have ended fractional reserve banking and, thus, private money creation. It would force banks to have 100% reserves backing deposits, and instead place money creation powers solely in the hands of the US Government. This would make targeting money growth more possible, as endogenous money created by fractional reserve lending would no longer be a major issue.^[77]

Exchange rates[edit]

Friedman was a strong advocate for floating exchange rates throughout the entire Bretton-Woods period. He argued that a flexible exchange rate would make external adjustment possible and allow countries to avoid balance of payments crises. He saw fixed exchange rates as an undesirable form of government intervention. The case was articulated in an influential 1953 paper, 'The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates', at a time, when most commentators regarded the possibility of floating exchange rates as a fantasy.^[82][83]

School choice[edit]

In his 1955 article 'The Role of Government in Education'^[84] Friedman proposed supplementing publicly operated schools with privately run but publicly funded schools through a system of school vouchers.^[85] Reforms similar to those proposed in the article were implemented in, for example, Chile in 1981 and Sweden in 1992.^[86] In 1996, Friedman, together with his wife, founded the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice to advocate school choice and vouchers. In 2016, the Friedman Foundation changed its name to EdChoice to honor the Friedmans' desire to have the educational choice movement live on without their names attached to it after their deaths.^[15]

Conscription[edit]

While Walter Oi is credited with establishing the economic basis for a volunteer military, Milton Friedman was a proponent, stating that the draft was 'inconsistent with a free society.'^[87][88]In Capitalism and Freedom, he argued that conscription is inequitable and arbitrary, preventing young men from shaping their lives as they see fit.^[89] During the Nixon administration he headed the committee to research a conversion to paid/volunteer armed force. He would later state that his role in eliminating the conscription in the United States was his proudest accomplishment.^[12] Friedman did, however, believe a nation could compel military training as a reserve in case of war time.^[89]

Foreign policy[edit]

Biographer Lanny Ebenstein noted a drift over time in Friedman's views from an interventionist to a more cautious foreign policy.^[90] He supported US involvement in the Second World War and initially supported a hard line against Communism, but moderated over time.^[90] However, Friedman did state in a 1995 interview that he is an anti-interventionist.^[91] He opposed the Gulf War and the Iraq War.^[90] In a spring 2006 interview, Friedman said that the USA's stature in the world had been eroded by the Iraq War, but that it might be improved if Iraq were to become a peaceful and independent country.^[92]

Libertarianism and the Republican Party[edit]

Friedman was a supporter of the candidacy of Barry Goldwater against Lyndon Johnson following Kennedy in 1964.^[1] Later, he served as a member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board starting in 1981. In 1988, he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Medal of Science. He said that he was a libertarian philosophically, but a member of the U.S. Republican Party for the sake of 'expediency' ('I am a libertarian with a small 'l' and a Republican with a capital 'R.' And I am a Republican with a capital 'R' on grounds of expediency, not on principle.') But, he said, 'I think the term classical liberal is also equally applicable. I don't really care very much what I'm called. I'm much more interested in having people thinking about the ideas, rather than the person.'^[93]

Public goods and monopoly[edit]

Friedman was supportive of the state provision of some public goods that private businesses are not considered as being able to provide. However, he argued that many of the services performed by government could be performed better by the private sector. Above all, if some public goods are provided by the state, he believed that they should not be a legal monopoly where private competition is prohibited; for example, he wrote:

There is no way to justify our present public monopoly of the post office. It may be argued that the carrying of mail is a technical monopoly and that a government monopoly is the least of evils. Along these lines, one could perhaps justify a government post office, but not the present law, which makes it illegal for anybody else to carry the mail. If the delivery of mail is a technical monopoly, no one else will be able to succeed in competition with the government. If it is not, there is no reason why the government should be engaged in it. The only way to find out is to leave other people free to enter.

Social security, welfare programs, and negative income tax[edit]

In 1962, Friedman criticized Social Security in his book Capitalism and Freedom arguing that it had created welfare dependency.^[94] However, in the penultimate chapter of the same book, Friedman argued that while capitalism had greatly reduced the extent of poverty in absolute terms, 'poverty is in part a relative matter, [and] even in [wealthy Western] countries, there are clearly many people living under conditions that the rest of us label as poverty.' Friedman noted that while private charity could be one recourse for alleviating poverty (and cited late 19th century Britain and the United States as exemplary periods of extensive private charity and eleemosynary activity), Friedman also noted that:

It can be argued that private charity is insufficient because the benefits from it accrue to people other than those who make the gifts— .. a neighborhood effect. I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its alleviation; but I am benefited equally whether I or someone else pays for its alleviation; the benefits of other people's charity therefore partly accrue to me. To put it differently, we might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else did. We might not be willing to contribute the same amount without such assurance. In small communities, public pressure can suffice to realize the proviso even with private charity. In the large impersonal communities that are increasingly coming to dominate our society, it is much more difficult for it to do so.

Suppose one accepts, as I do, this line of reasoning as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty; to set, as it were, a floor under the standard of life of every person in the community. [While there are questions of how much should be spent and how, the] arrangement that recommends itself on purely mechanical grounds is a negative income tax. .. The advantages of this arrangement are clear. It is directed specifically at the problem of poverty. It gives help in the form most useful to the individual, namely, cash. It is general and could be substituted for the host of special measures now in effect. It makes explicit the cost borne by society. It operates outside the market. Like any other measures to alleviate poverty, it reduces the incentives of those helped to help themselves, but it does not eliminate that incentive entirely, as a system of supplementing incomes up to some fixed minimum would. An extra dollar earned always means more money available for expenditure.

Friedman argued further that other advantages of the negative income tax were that it could fit directly into the tax system, would be less costly, and would reduce the administrative burden of implementing a social safety net.^[95] Friedman reiterated these arguments 18 years later in Free to Choose, with the additional proviso that such a reform would only be satisfactory if it replaced the current system of welfare programs rather than augment it.^[96] According to economist Robert H. Frank, writing in The New York Times, Friedman's views in this regard were grounded in a belief that while 'market forces .. accomplish wonderful things', they 'cannot ensure a distribution of income that enables all citizens to meet basic economic needs'.^[97]

Drug policy[edit]

Friedman also supported libertarian policies such as legalization of drugs and prostitution. During 2005, Friedman and more than 500 other economists advocated discussions regarding the economic benefits of the legalization of marijuana.^[98]

Gay rights[edit]

Friedman was also a supporter of gay rights.^[99] He never specifically supported same-sex marriage, instead saying 'I do not believe there should be any discrimination against gays.'^[100]

Immigration[edit]

Hans Kohn The Idea Of Nationalism

Friedman favored immigration, saying 'legal and illegal immigration has a very positive impact on the U.S. economy.'^[101] Friedman however suggested that immigrants ought not to have access to the welfare system.^[101] Friedman stated that immigration from Mexico had been a 'good thing', in particular illegal immigration.^[101] Friedman argued that illegal immigration was a boon because they 'take jobs that most residents of this country are unwilling to take, they provide employers with workers of a kind they cannot get' and they do not use welfare.^[101] In Free to Choose, Friedman wrote,^[96]

No arbitrary obstacles should prevent people from achieving those positions for which their talents fit them and which their values lead them to seek. Not birth, nationality, color, religion, sex, nor any other irrelevant characteristic should determine the opportunities that are open to a person — only his abilities.

Economic freedom[edit]

Michael Walker of the Fraser Institute and Friedman hosted a series of conferences from 1986 to 1994. The goal was to create a clear definition of economic freedom and a method for measuring it. Eventually this resulted in the first report on worldwide economic freedom, Economic Freedom in the World.^[102] This annual report has since provided data for numerous peer-reviewed studies and has influenced policy in several nations.

Along with sixteen other distinguished economists he opposed the Copyright Term Extension Act, and signed on to an amicus brief filed in Eldred v. Ashcroft.^[103] Friedman jokingly described it as a 'no-brainer'.^[104]

Friedman argued for stronger basic legal (constitutional) protection of economic rights and freedoms to further promote industrial-commercial growth and prosperity and buttress democracy and freedom and the rule of law generally in society.^[105]

Honors, recognition, and influence[edit]

George H. Nash, a leading historian of American conservatism, says that by 'the end of the 1960s he was probably the most highly regarded and influential conservative scholar in the country, and one of the few with an international reputation.'^[106] Friedman allowed the libertarian Cato Institute to use his name for its biannual Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty beginning in 2001. A Friedman Prize was given to the late British economist Peter Bauer in 2002, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in 2004, Mart Laar, former Estonian Prime Minister in 2006 and a young Venezuelan student Yon Goicoechea in 2008. His wife Rose, sister of Aaron Director, with whom he initiated the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, served on the international selection committee.^[107][108] Friedman was also a recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.

Upon Friedman's death, Harvard President Lawrence Summers called him 'The Great Liberator' saying '.. any honest Democrat will admit that we are now all Friedmanites.' He said Friedman's great popular contribution was 'in convincing people of the importance of allowing free markets to operate.'^[109]

In 2013 Stephen Moore, a member of the editorial forward of The Wall Street Journal said, 'Quoting the most-revered champion of free-market economics since Adam Smith has become a little like quoting the Bible.' He adds, 'There are sometimes multiple and conflicting interpretations.'^[110]

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences[edit]

Friedman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the sole recipient for 1976, 'for his achievements in the fields of consumption analysis, monetary history and theory and for his demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy.'^[4]

Hong Kong[edit]

Friedman once said, 'If you want to see capitalism in action, go to Hong Kong.'^[111] He wrote in 1990 that the Hong Kong economy was perhaps the best example of a free market economy.^[112]

One month before his death, he wrote the article 'Hong Kong Wrong—What would Cowperthwaite say?' in The Wall Street Journal, criticizing Donald Tsang, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, for abandoning 'positive noninterventionism.'^[113]Tsang later said he was merely changing the slogan to 'big market, small government,' where small government is defined as less than 20% of GDP. In a debate between Tsang and his rival, Alan Leong, before the 2007 Chief Executive election, Leong introduced the topic and jokingly accused Tsang of angering Friedman to death.^{[citation needed]}

Chile[edit]

During 1975, two years after the military coup that brought military dictator President Augusto Pinochet to power and ended the government of Salvador Allende, the economy of Chile experienced a severe crisis. Friedman and Arnold Harberger accepted an invitation of a private Chilean foundation to visit Chile and speak on principles of economic freedom.^[114] He spent seven days in Chile giving a series of lectures at the Universidad Católica de Chile and the (National) University of Chile. One of the lectures was entitled 'The Fragility of Freedom' and according to Friedman, 'dealt with precisely the threat to freedom from a centralized military government.'^[115]

In an April 21, 1975, letter to Pinochet, Friedman considered the 'key economic problems of Chile are clearly .. inflation and the promotion of a healthy social market economy'.^[116] He stated that 'There is only one way to end inflation: by drastically reducing the rate of increase of the quantity of money ..' and that '.. cutting government spending is by far and away the most desirable way to reduce the fiscal deficit, because it .. strengthens the private sector thereby laying the foundations for healthy economic growth'.^[116] As to how rapidly inflation should be ended, Friedman felt that 'for Chile where inflation is raging at 10–20% a month .. gradualism is not feasible. It would involve so painful an operation over so long a period that the patient would not survive.' Choosing 'a brief period of higher unemployment ..' was the lesser evil. and that 'the experience of Germany, .. of Brazil .., of the post-war adjustment in the U.S. .. all argue for shock treatment'. In the letter Friedman recommended to deliver the shock approach with '.. a package to eliminate the surprise and to relieve acute distress' and '.. for definiteness let me sketch the contents of a package proposal .. to be taken as illustrative' although his knowledge of Chile was 'too limited to enable [him] to be precise or comprehensive'. He listed a 'sample proposal' of 8 monetary and fiscal measures including 'the removal of as many as obstacles as possible that now hinder the private market. For example, suspend .. the present law against discharging employees'. He closed, stating 'Such a shock program could end inflation in months'. His letter suggested that cutting spending to reduce the fiscal deficit would result in less transitional unemployment than raising taxes.

Sergio de Castro, a Chilean Chicago School graduate, became the nation's Minister of Finance in 1975. During his six-year tenure, foreign investment increased, restrictions were placed on striking and labor unions, and GDP rose yearly.^[117] A foreign exchange program was created between the Catholic University of Chile and the University of Chicago. Many other Chicago School alumni were appointed government posts during and after the Pinochet years; others taught its economic doctrine at Chilean universities. They became known as the Chicago Boys.^[118]

Friedman did not criticize Pinochet's dictatorship at the time, nor the assassinations, illegal imprisonments, torture, or other atrocities that were well known by then.^[119]In 1976 Friedman defended his unofficial adviser position with: 'I do not consider it as evil for an economist to render technical economic advice to the Chilean Government, any more than I would regard it as evil for a physician to give technical medical advice to the Chilean Government to help end a medical plague.'^[120]

Friedman defended his activity in Chile on the grounds that, in his opinion, the adoption of free market policies not only improved the economic situation of Chile but also contributed to the amelioration of Pinochet's rule and to the eventual transition to a democratic government during 1990. That idea is included in Capitalism and Freedom, in which he declared that economic freedom is not only desirable in itself but is also a necessary condition for political freedom. In his 1980 documentary Free to Choose, he said the following: 'Chile is not a politically free system, and I do not condone the system. But the people there are freer than the people in Communist societies because government plays a smaller role. .. The conditions of the people in the past few years has been getting better and not worse. They would be still better to get rid of the junta and to be able to have a free democratic system.'^[121][122] In 1984, Friedman stated that he has 'never refrained from criticizing the political system in Chile.'^[115] In 1991 he said: 'I have nothing good to say about the political regime that Pinochet imposed. It was a terrible political regime. The real miracle of Chile is not how well it has done economically; the real miracle of Chile is that a military junta was willing to go against its principles and support a free market regime designed by principled believers in a free market. .. In Chile, the drive for political freedom, that was generated by economic freedom and the resulting economic success, ultimately resulted in a referendum that introduced political democracy. Now, at long last, Chile has all three things: political freedom, human freedom and economic freedom. Chile will continue to be an interesting experiment to watch to see whether it can keep all three or whether, now that it has political freedom, that political freedom will tend to be used to destroy or reduce economic freedom.'^[123] He stressed that the lectures he gave in Chile were the same lectures he later gave in China and other socialist states.^[124]

During the 2000 PBS documentary The Commanding Heights (based on the book), Friedman continued to argue that 'free markets would undermine [Pinochet's] political centralization and political control.',^[125][126] and that criticism over his role in Chile missed his main contention that freer markets resulted in freer people, and that Chile's unfree economy had caused the military government. Friedman advocated for free markets which undermined 'political centralization and political control'.^[127]

Iceland[edit]

Friedman visited Iceland during the autumn of 1984, met with important Icelanders and gave a lecture at the University of Iceland on the 'tyranny of the status quo.' He participated in a lively television debate on August 31, 1984, with socialist intellectuals, including Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who later became the president of Iceland.^[128] When they complained that a fee was charged for attending his lecture at the university and that, hitherto, lectures by visiting scholars had been free-of-charge, Friedman replied that previous lectures had not been free-of-charge in a meaningful sense: lectures always have related costs. What mattered was whether attendees or non-attendees covered those costs. Friedman thought that it was fairer that only those who attended paid. In this discussion Friedman also stated that he did not receive any money for delivering that lecture.

Estonia[edit]

Although Friedman never visited Estonia, his book Free to Choose exercised a great influence on that nation's then 32-year-old prime minister, Mart Laar, who has claimed that it was the only book on economics he had read before taking office. Laar's reforms are often credited with responsibility for transforming Estonia from an impoverished Soviet Republic to the 'Baltic Tiger.' A prime element of Laar's program was introduction of the flat tax. Laar won the 2006 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, awarded by the Cato Institute.^[129]

United Kingdom[edit]

After 1950 Friedman was frequently invited to lecture in Britain, and by the 1970s his ideas had gained widespread attention in conservative circles. For example, he was a regular speaker at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a libertarian think tank. Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher closely followed IEA programs and ideas, and met Friedman there in 1978. He also strongly influenced Keith Joseph, who became Thatcher's senior advisor on economic affairs, as well as Alan Walters and Patrick Minford, two other key advisers. Major newspapers, including the Daily Telegraph,The Times, and The Financial Times all promulgated Friedman's monetarist ideas to British decision-makers. Friedman's ideas strongly influenced Thatcher and her allies when she became Prime Minister in 1979.^[130][131]

United States[edit]

After his death a number of obituaries and articles were written in Friedman's honor, citing him as one of the most important and influential economists of the post war era.^{[132][133][134][135]} Milton Friedman's somewhat controversial legacy^[136][137] in America remains strong within the conservative movement.^[138] However, some journalists and economists like Noah Smith and Scott Sumner have argued Friedman's academic legacy has been buried under his political philosophy and misinterpreted by modern conservatives.^{[139][140][141][142]}

Criticism[edit]

Econometrician David Hendry criticized part of Friedman's and Anna Schwartz's 1982 Monetary Trends.^[143] When asked about it during an interview with Icelandic TV in 1984,^[144] Friedman said that the criticism referred to a different problem from that which he and Schwartz had tackled, and hence was irrelevant,^[145] and pointed out the lack of consequential peer review amongst econometricians on Hendry's work.^[146] In 2006, Hendry said that Friedman was guilty of 'serious errors' of misunderstanding that meant 'the t-ratios he reported for UK money demand were overstated by nearly 100 per cent', and said that, in a paper published in 1991 with Neil Ericsson,^[147] he had refuted 'almost every empirical claim .. made about UK money demand' by Friedman and Schwartz.^[148] A 2004 paper updated and confirmed the validity of the Hendry–Ericsson findings through 2000.^[149]

Although KeynesianNobel laureatePaul Krugman praised Friedman as a 'great economist and a great man' after Friedman's death in 2006, and acknowledged his many, widely accepted contributions to empirical economics, Krugman had been, and remains, a prominent critic of Friedman. Krugman has written that 'he slipped all too easily into claiming both that markets always work and that only markets work. It's extremely hard to find cases in which Friedman acknowledged the possibility that markets could go wrong, or that government intervention could serve a useful purpose.'^[150] Others agree Friedman was not open enough to the possibility of market inefficiencies.^[151] Economist Noah Smith argues that while Milton Friedman made many important contributions to economic theory not all of his ideas relating to macroeconomics have entirely held up over the years and that too few people are willing to challenge them.^[80][152]

Political scientist C.B. Macpherson disagreed with Friedman's historical assessment of economic freedom leading to political freedom, suggesting that political freedom actually gave way to economic freedom for property owning elites. He also challenged the notion that markets efficiently allocated resources and rejected Friedman's definition of liberty.^[153] Friedman's positivist methodological approach to economics has also been critiqued and debated.^{[154][155][156]}Finnish economist Uskali Mäki has argued some of his assumptions were unrealistic and vague.^[157][158]

In her book The Shock Doctrine, author and social activist Naomi Klein criticized Friedman's economic liberalism, identifying it with the principles that guided the economic restructuring that followed the military coups in countries such as Chile and Argentina. Based on their assessments of the extent to which what she describes as neoliberal policies contributed to income disparities and inequality, both Klein and Noam Chomsky have suggested that the primary role of what they describe as neoliberalism was as an ideological cover for capital accumulation by multinational corporations.^[159]

Visit to Chile[edit]

Because of his involvement with the Pinochet government, there were international protests when Friedman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1976.^[160] Friedman was accused of supporting the military dictatorship in Chile because of the relation of economists of the University of Chicago to Pinochet, and a controversial seven-day trip^[161] he took to Chile during March 1975 (less than two years after the coup that ended with the death of President Salvador Allende). Friedman answered that he never was an adviser to the dictatorship, but only gave some lectures and seminars on inflation, and met with officials, including Augusto Pinochet, while in Chile.^[162]

Chilean economist Orlando Letelier asserted that Pinochet's dictatorship resorted to oppression because of popular opposition to Chicago School policies in Chile.^[163] After a 1991 speech on drug legalisation, Friedman answered a question on his involvement with the Pinochet regime, saying that he was never an advisor to Pinochet (also mentioned in his 1984 Iceland interview),^[115] but that a group of his students at the University of Chicago were involved in Chile's economic reforms. Friedman credited these reforms with high levels of economic growth and with the establishment of democracy that has subsequently occurred in Chile.^[164][165] In October 1988, after returning from a lecture tour of China during which he had met with Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Friedman wrote to The Stanford Daily asking if he should anticipate a similar 'avalanche of protests for having been willing to give advice to so evil a government? And if not, why not?'^[166]

Selected bibliography[edit]

• A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957) ISBN1614278121.
• A Program for Monetary Stability (Fordham University Press, 1960) 110 pp. online versionISBN0-8232-0371-9
• Capitalism and Freedom (1962), highly influential series of essays that established Friedman's position on major issues of public policy excerpts
• A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, with Anna J. Schwartz, 1963; part 3 reprinted as The Great Contraction
• 'The Role of Monetary Policy.' American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar. 1968), pp. 1–17 JSTOR presidential address to American Economics Association
• 'Inflation and Unemployment: Nobel Lecture', 1977, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 85, pp. 451–72. JSTOR
• Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, with Rose Friedman, (1980), highly influential restatement of policy views
• The Essence of Friedman, essays edited by Kurt R. Leube, (1987) (ISBN0-8179-8662-6)
• Two Lucky People: Memoirs (with Rose Friedman) ISBN0-226-26414-9 (1998) excerpt and text search
• Milton Friedman on Economics: Selected Papers by Milton Friedman, edited by Gary S. Becker (2008)

See also[edit]

• 'We are all Keynesians now'

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

1. ^ ^abEbenstein 2007, p. 89
2. ^ ^abCharles Moore (2013). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning. Penguin. pp. 576–77. ISBN978-1846146497.
3. ^ ^abcEbenstein 2007, p. 208
4. ^ ^ab'Milton Friedman on nobelprize.org'. Nobel Prize. 1976. Archived from the original on April 12, 2008. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
5. ^Thomas Sowell (2016). A Personal Odyssey. Free Press. p. 320. ISBN978-0743215084.
6. ^Johan Van Overtveldt (2009). The Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled the Thinkers Who Revolutionized Economics and Business. Agate Publishing. ISBN978-1-57284-649-4.
7. ^'Milton Friedman'. Commanding Heights. PBS. October 1, 2000. Archived from the original on September 8, 2011. Retrieved September 19, 2011.
8. ^'Milton Friedman—Economist as Public Intellectual'Archived May 29, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. Archived May 29, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. Dallasfed.org (April 1, 2016). Retrieved on September 6, 2017.
9. ^Mark Skousen (2009). The Making of Modern Economics: The Lives and Ideas of the Great Thinkers. M.E. Sharpe. p. 407. ISBN978-0-7656-2227-3.
10. ^Among macroeconomists, the 'natural' rate has been increasingly replaced by James Tobin's NAIRU, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, which is seen as having fewer normative connotations.
11. ^Paul Krugman (1995). Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations. p. 43. 'In 1968 in one of the decisive intellectual achievements of postwar economics, Friedman not only showed why the apparent tradeoff embodied in the idea of the Phillips curve was wrong; he also predicted the emergence of combined inflation and high unemployment .. dubbed 'stagflation'.
12. ^ ^abBrian Doherty (June 1, 1995). 'Best of Both Worlds'. Reason Magazine. Archived from the original on October 11, 2014. Retrieved October 24, 2009.
13. ^Edward Nelson (April 13, 2011). 'Friedman's Monetary Economics in Practice'Archived December 31, 2014, at the Wayback Machine. 'in important respects, the overall monetary and financial policy response to the crisis can be viewed as Friedman's monetary economics in practice. .. Friedman's recommendations for responding to a financial crisis largely lined up with the principal financial and monetary policy measures taken since 2007'. 'Review' in Journal of Economic Literature (December 2012). 50#4. pp. 1106–09.
14. ^'Milton Friedman (1912–2006)'Archived January 3, 2007, at the Wayback Machine. Econlib.org. Retrieved on September 6, 2017.
15. ^ ^abMaureen Sullivan (July 30, 2016). 'Milton Friedman's Name Disappears From Foundation, But His School-Choice Beliefs Live On'. Forbes. Archived from the original on September 21, 2016. Retrieved September 14, 2016.
16. ^'Milton Friedman'. Encyclopedia Britannica. Archived from the original on August 2, 2017. Retrieved August 2, 2017.
17. ^'Capitalism and Friedman' (editorial). The Wall Street Journal. November 17, 2006.
18. ^Václav Klaus (January 29, 2007). 'Remarks at Milton Friedman Memorial Service'. Archived from the original on July 2, 2007. Retrieved August 22, 2008.
19. ^Johan Norberg (October 2008). 'Defaming Milton Friedman: Naomi Klein's disastrous yet popular polemic against the great free market economist'Archived April 11, 2010, at the Wayback Machine. Reason Magazine. Washington, D.C.
20. ^Friedman 1999, p. 506.
21. ^William L Davis, Bob Figgins, David Hedengren and Daniel B. Klein (May 2011). 'Economic Professors' Favorite Economic Thinkers, Journals, and Blogs'Archived December 18, 2011, at the Wayback Machine. Econ Journal Watch. 8(2). pp. 126–46.
22. ^'Milton Friedman, a giant among economists'. The Economist. November 23, 2006. Archived from the original on February 17, 2008. Retrieved February 20, 2008.
23. ^'Who's who in American Jewry'. 1980.
24. ^Ebenstein 2007, p. 10
25. ^Milton & Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People. Memoirs, Chicago 1998, p. 22.
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Sources[edit]

Works cited

• Bernanke, Ben (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press. ISBN978-0-691-11820-8.
• Ebenstein, Alan O. (2007). Milton Friedman: A Biography. St. Martin's Press. ISBN978-0-230-60345-5.
• Friedman, Milton (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. University of Chicago Press. ISBN978-0-226-26415-8.

Further reading[edit]

• 'Symposium: Why Is There No Milton Friedman Today?'. Econ Journal Watch. 10 (2). May 2013.
• McCloskey, Deirdre (Winter 2003). 'Other Things Equal: Milton'. Eastern Economic Journal. 29 (1): 143–46. JSTOR40326463.
• Steelman, Aaron (2008). 'Friedman, Milton (1912–2006)'. In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE; Cato Institute. pp. 195–97. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n118. ISBN978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN2008009151. OCLC750831024.
• Wood, John Cunningham, and Ronald N. Wood, ed. (1990), Milton Friedman: Critical Assessments, v. 3. Scroll to chapter-preview links. Routledge.

External links[edit]

• Collected Works of Milton Friedman (Multiple Text, audio, video)
• The Milton Friedman papers at the Hoover Institution Archives
• Selected Bibliography for Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago Library
• Profile and Papers at Research Papers in Economics/RePEc
• 'Milton Friedman collected news and commentary'. The New York Times.
• Milton Friedman on IMDb
• Becker Friedman Institute at the University of Chicago
• Milton Fridman at Scarlett
• Inflation and Unemployment 1976 lecture at NobelPrize.org
• Milton Friedman (1912–2006). The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of Economics and Liberty (2nd ed.). Liberty Fund. 2008.
• Interview with Milton Friedman, Dominic Streatfeild, May 25, 2000, source material for Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography
• Milton Friedman vs. The Fed Bailout by Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, July 17, 2009
• Four Deformations of the Apocalypse, David Stockman, The New York Times, July 31, 2010
• Roberts, Russ. 'Milton Friedman Podcasts'. EconTalk. Library of Economics and Liberty.
• Milton Friedman publications indexed by Google Scholar

Videos

• Appearances on C-SPAN
• A film clip 'The Open Mind – Living Within Our Means (1975)' is available at the Internet Archive
• A film clip 'The Open Mind – A Nobel Laureate on the American Economy (1977)' is available at the Internet Archive
• Milton Friedman on Charlie Rose
• Free To Choose on YouTube
• Milton Friedman, Commanding Heights, PBS, October 1, 2000, interview, profile and video
• Milton Friedman at the Cato Institute